Organizer: Katherine A. Bowie, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Chair: Ellen Rafferty, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Colonial-metropolitan impetus in the Philippine Constitution making of 1934-1935
Organizer: Maria Elena P. Rivera-Beckstrom, New School for Social Research
The historical impetus for the making of the original Philippine constitution of 1935 was the granting of its commonwealth status by the United States, and the eventual independence which was the result of the politics in the metropole (Grunder and Livezey 1951; Jenkins 1954; Kirk 1964) and negotiations between the Filipino political leaders and the US politicians. Ultimately, the determining impetus came from the metropole and although the constitution was framed by the Filipinos, the United States had already set the terms and parameters of the constitution for the commonwealth government. This paper discusses the historical causal conditions and role of the politics between the US and the Philippines during the constitution making of 1934 to 1935. It argues that the colonial-metropolitan impetus for the making of the original constitution had implications on the Filipinos' sense of nationalism and on the constitutional process. Because of this impetus the Filipino leaders had to be pragmatic. Their nationalism dictates a desire for an independent Philippines and they regard constitution making as a symbol for the achievement of their nationalist ideals, the founding of a nation; but in order to achieve such independence and eventually found a sovereign nation, they had to concede to the conditions set by a colonial power. Consequently, this colonial-metropolitan impetus resulted to an appreciation of the constitutional process that is pragmatic and flexible, setting a precedent for the postcolonial pattern in constitution making.
From 1999 to 2002 the Indonesian province of Maluku was the site of bloody communal conflict between Christians and Muslims. Although there are still occasional outbreaks of violence, Maluku has made remarkable progress on its path to reconstruction and reconciliation. In July 2008, the people of Maluku had the first opportunity to judge the government’s role in this process when they went to the polls in Maluku’s first-ever direct governor election (pilkada). The result – a resounding victory for the incumbent governor Karel Ralahalu – indicates that Malukans are apparently very satisfied with the government’s performance in the last five years. Based on findings from two recent field trips to Maluku, this paper will analyze the 2008 governor election in Maluku and put its extraordinary result into the broader context of the province’s current trajectory of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. It will be argued that even though the pilkada was characterized by some minor deficiencies, the fact that neither the electoral process as such nor the subsequent announcement of the results triggered a new wave of violence should be regarded as a significant success. Most importantly, all the key players including those who lost the contest seem to have accepted that free and direct democratic elections are now the only legitimate means to distribute formal power. While a final judgment on Maluku’s long-term prospects for political and social stability may only be possible after the legislative election in 2009, the pilkada was certainly a major step on Maluku’s path back to normality.
Democratizing regimes that attempt to accommodate their separatist movements through offers of decentralization and autonomy invariably encounter obstacles. Since the initiation of democracy in Indonesia in 1998, Jakarta has also faced a difficult dilemma of how much freedom to grant the Acehnese and Papuan peoples without releasing control over the territories of Aceh and Papua. To Indonesia’s easternmost province of Papua, Jakarta offered ‘special autonomy’ before partitioning the province into two in an unsuccessful bid to contain separatist ambitions there. In the west, Aceh rejected a similar offer of special autonomy, but later negotiated for ‘self-governance’, which granted the Acehnese meaningful autonomy within the Indonesian state and brought an end to one of Asia’s most enduring conflicts. This paper argues that since 1998 the opportunity to deal with separatist challenges from Aceh and Papua has been greatest during periods when the Indonesian state has been structurally extremely weak. This is because windows of opportunity, or political moments, tend to appear in times of national crisis, when key political actors recognize that some critical aspect of the existing system has failed and decide to work towards instituting positive change. Although state actors may fail to seize the opportunity presented by a ‘crisis’ to accommodate their aggrieved minorities, as occurred in Papua and Aceh after regime change, the resolution of the Aceh conflict following the 2004 tsunami showed that windows of opportunity that emerge during crises may equally change the way political actors think about themselves and the range of opportunities available to them.
In recent decades, Bali has become a popular source for mass-produced handicrafts among international wholesalers and retailers. As consumer demand for handicrafts increases abroad, Balinese artisans have diversified their repertoire from traditional masks, woodcarvings and basketry to include other forms “ethnic” arts and crafts. African masks, Native American totem poles, Moroccan furniture and other reproductions of cultural artifacts have become commonplace commodities in the Balinese handicrafts export market. As a consequence of the proliferation of ethnic art on the island, local souvenir vendors have diversified their wares to include these ethnic artifacts for tourist consumption (and have done so with success). The popularity of ethnic crafts in the souvenir marketplace reflects not only changing consumer trends, but also points to an interesting dimension of consuming “the Other” in an era of multicultural communities and transnational economies. This paper addresses the impact of the ethnic arts market, and in particular, the role foreign wholesalers/retailers and tourists have played in shaping and enforcing ideas of “ethnic” aesthetics for export and consumption. Addressing topics such as authenticity, modernity, commodity fetishism and cultural borrowing, this paper examines issues of modernity, cultural production, power and representation in the context of transnational economies and cultures.
While cross-gender performance in Java has been an accepted practice integral to social dance, ritual and theater since at least the mid-nineteenth century (Pigeaud 1938), it is also a strategy that individuals have used to challenge national Indonesian constructions of maleness and femaleness during the socio-political eras of the Old Order (1945-66), New Order (1966-98) and Reformation (1998-present) (Blackwood 2005; Mrázek 2005). Strikingly, as I studied music and dance in the east Javanese regency of Malang from 2005-07, older musicians and dancers frequently criticized young women for performing Ngrémo Tayub, a male dance, too coquettishly. This critique—which implies that women are performing in a way that makes onstage gender transgression more obvious—has led me to consider the cultural politics that have surrounded the production of womanhood in current times. I contend that, paradoxically, through performance of male dance, women have been redefining womanhood, thereby disrupting older generations’ assumptions about gender that have been shaped by Old and New Order sensibilities. To support my claim, I compare constructions of femaleness promoted by the Indonesian government in different historical periods and how performers of different generations rearticulated these discourses to produce their own senses of gender through performance and ways of talking about performance. Focusing on conventions of music and dance since the 1990s, I show that women have used Ngrémo Tayub to re-open social and political spaces available to them prior to the New Order regime, ultimately contesting constructions of femaleness imposed by the government and older performers.
“Family” is a complex phenomenon whose meanings range from political ideology, to world view, to residence, to kinship. Keeping in mind the multifarious definitions of “family,” this paper examines an intellectual genealogy of "kekeluargaan," the Indonesian term that became a focal point of state development. The existing scholarship has largely examined issues of authoritarianism since Indonesia’s independence in 1945. The Javanese philosophy of "kawulo-gusti," or reciprocal relationships between rulers and subordinates, German philosophy, and Japanese totalitarian regime have influenced intellectuals such as Raden Supomo (1903-1958) to conceptualize "kekeluargaan" as a pillar of “organic state” wherein the state directs decision-making and oversees citizens’ rights to political participation. Nonetheless, close reading of selected journals, magazines, and personal sources from the early twentieth century shows "kekeluargaan" is built on broader discussions about the place of “family” in Indonesia. Mohammad Hatta (1902-1980), drawing from "kooperasi" (cooperative) in Scandinavian social democracy and family-based village economy, referred to "kekeluargaan" as the principle of the national economy, which was written into the first constitution promulgated in August 1945. Meanwhile, a transnational influence of making the (nuclear) family the smallest social unit gained currency, and in the early 1950s "kekeluargaan" became synonymous with the wellbeing of the family. Concurrently, Supomo and Hatta expressed reservations about the practical application of kekeluargaan, particularly its cooperative strength, in economic development. Building on these discussions, I argue that as the Indonesian state unfolded, "kekeluargaan" became an umbrella term that concealed discrepancies between practice and idea about “family,” in pursuit of development and modernization.
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