Organizer and Chair: Eiko Maruko Siniawer, Williams College

Discussants: Kevin M. Doak, Georgetown University; Michael Lewis, Michigan State University

Debates about the nature of Taisho democracy have centered on topics such as the extent of popular political participation, the influence of mass demonstrations, the viability of political parties, and the strength of the state. This panel approaches these issues with a focus on a phenomenon that is often touched upon, but rarely given a place of central importance: political violence. All of the papers examine the relationship between violence and democracy in the 1910s and 1920s, and address questions about the extent to which violence has a role in, and needs to be a part of, democracies.

The three papers deal with the dynamic relationship between the violent politics of the street and larger national, political, and social structures. As a whole, they explore how and why violence emerges, continues, and dies down. Jin-hee Lee argues that fear was crucial in the emergence and reproduction of violence against the colonized in the Japanese metropole. Eiko Maruko Siniawer suggests that the institutionalization of physical force and a culture of political violence help explain the continued presence of political ruffians in parliamentary politics. And Yuko Fujino contends that urban riots died down in the 1920s because of new political and social systems that provided people with certain rights. All of the papers are intended to provoke discussion about what an examination of violence can tell us about the very nature of Taisho democracy.

To facilitate active discussion, presentations will be kept short and the panel will have two discussants.

Jin-hee Lee, Eastern Illinois University

Fear is powerful. A sense of impending violence can drive people to arm themselves against a perceived enemy—whether imagined or real. This paper concerns the eruption of fear and violence against the colonized in the Japanese metropole during the era of Taisho democracy. Believing in the rumors of the imminent attack of "rebellious Koreans" (futei senjin), Japanese vigilantes (jikeidan) armed and massacred thousands of Koreans in the Tokyo metropolitan area. In order to contextualize the rise of vigilante violence, I examine its origin in the government’s campaign to enlist ordinary citizens in the police force (minshu no keisatsuka) in the 1910s. During the following decade, these organizations continued to grow especially following the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, a watershed moment for a dramatic increase in the number and scope of organizations as they provided for public security and reconstruction in the midst of unprecedented physical and social disruption. I analyze textual and visual records of the vigilante violence exploring the meaning of ji (self), kei (defense), and dan (organization): How did the vigilantes perceive the boundary of the communal "self" to defend?; How did they organize themselves and what were their major activities?; What does the prevalent fear and violence tell us about the nature of "democracy" in the empire? By addressing these issues, I highlight not only the dynamic impact of imperialism in the metropole but also the reproductive, perpetuating nature of colonial violence in the unsettled multiethnic Japanese empire.

Eiko Maruko Siniawer, Williams College

Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, political ruffians (soshi) were fixtures in Japanese political life, wielding sticks, swords, clubs, and pistols to disrupt public meetings, influence voters, and intimidate political opponents. They formed the violent wings of lobbying groups (ingaidan) attached to political parties, and thus were organized and institutionalized into Taisho politics. This paper examines the consequences of such organized and institutionalized violence for the practice of democracy by focusing on the role of political ruffians in the elections of the 1910s and 1920s, as well as in the First Movement to Protect Constitutional Government in 1912-1913 and the Second Movement in 1924. Also addressed in the context of these events are the ties that formed between the political ruffians of lobbying groups and the violent members of right-wing organizations.

That political ruffians were a visible and integral part of politics suggests that there existed in these decades a culture of political violence in which the use of physical force was tacitly acceptable. This paper argues that although certain kinds of violence may not necessarily be inimical to democracy, the existence of a culture of political violence compromised the legitimacy of the political parties and contributed to a relatively smooth transition into the fascist years of the 1930s.

Yuko Fujino, Waseda University

In the late 1900s and 1910s, urban riots frequently occurred in Japan, especially in Tokyo. Tens of thousands of people attacked and tore down government offices or police offices, and set them on fire. However, such popular violence has disappeared from Japanese society since the Rice Riots in 1918. This surely means that the new political and social systems restraining and preventing popular violence emerged in the 1920's, and have been maintained until now. What were the characteristics of urban riots in the 1900s-1910s? What systems did emerge after the 1920s? Focusing on these two problems, this paper reexamines the relationship between popular violence and democracy in modern Japan.

Many historians regard urban riots as immature democratic movements and consider that people acquired democratic systems, such as popular elections or social services, as a result of their movements. However, in fact, the relationship between popular violence and democracy was more complicated. Urban riots were a unique form of popular political behavior under the limited election system. On the other hand, some political groups and intellectuals demanded a popular election system for the purpose of making violent people learn "correct" political behavior. The government was also seeking the establishment of a poor-relief system and measures against juvenile crimes in order to prevent riots. This paper argues that one of the natures of democratic systems is to prevent and tame popular violence, by providing people with some kind of rights.