Organizer: David Yang, Princeton University

Chair: Atu Kohli, Princeton University

Discussant: Ashutosh Varshney, University of Michigan; Atu Kohli, Princeton University

In the current intellectual discourse on ethnic politics, instrumentalist theories are widely recognized for their explanatory powers vis-à-vis the remarkable variations in the political salience of ethnicity. However, instrumentalist approaches often exaggerate the ease with which ethnic identities can be constructed and individuals manipulated. The symbols of ethnicity may be powerful, but their invocation is not always successful. The challenge therefore is to identify the constraints placed upon the manipulative capacities of political actors. In this regard, Asia’s great cultural diversity offers many opportunities for theory development.

The papers in this panel aim to make a significant contribution to this effort, drawing upon a rich palette of methodological approaches and empirical evidence from across Asia. Dan Slater surveys the history of political development in Southeast Asia and offers a path-dependent interpretation of divergent regime outcomes in the region. In particular, the ability of the immediate post-colonial elites to co-opt the symbols of communal mobilization effectively determined the trajectories of these new regimes. Amit Ahuja addresses ethnic mobilization within a democratic political context. By comparing caste-based parties in four Indian states, Ahuja highlights the importance of social mobilization as a modulator of the effectiveness of ethnic mobilization. Finally, David Yang offers a sharply revisionist account of Taiwan's democratic transition as a fundamentally class-driven phenomenon. Yang argues that Taiwan’s ethnic divide had been a highly successful instrumentalist construction facilitated by the close intertwining of class and ethnic identities in Taiwan's transitional society.

Daniel Slater, University of Chicago

he past two decades have witnessed a dizzying array of political regime outcomes in Southeast Asia. Why did 'reformasi' succeed in removing a dictator in Indonesia but fail to force regime change in Malaysia? Why did democratic protests overcome military intransigence in Thailand but not Burma? And why have no significant protest movements arisen at all in countries as diverse as Singapore, Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei? This essay argues that democratic mobilization is more likely both to occur and to succeed when "communal elites" – a society’s main sources of ethno-nationalist, religious, and traditional legitimacy – are available to the political opposition. Such availability depends on how historical legacies of colonial rule, decolonization, and authoritarian onset have shaped the politics of ethnicity, nation, and religion in Southeast Asian societies. Understanding authoritarianism and democratization in the region thus requires sharpened attention to the distinct and divergent patterns of ethnic frictions and nationalist passions that arose during the making of new states and nations, and their manipulation by political elites in the immediate post-colonial era.

Daniel Slater, University of Chicago

In India, Dalits have been mobilized extensively across different states. Dalit-based political parties, however, have been electorally successful only in some states and not others. I investigate this puzzle by focusing on Dalit mobilization in four large Indian states: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra. Dalit is the name that former "untouchables" give themselves. They form 16 percent of the Indian population. The literature on Ethnic mobilization in general and on ethnic parties in particular does not draw a distinction between the political mobilization of socially marginalized and socially dominant groups. It also overlooks the sequencing of electoral and social mobilization. As a result, it is unable to satisfactorily address the question posed above. I hypothesize that where the Dalits had undergone social mobilization prior to their electoral mobilization, and the successive state governments spent a higher per capita amount on the poor, Dalit parties when they appeared remained weak. In contrast, in those states where Dalits were not socially mobilized, and the successive governments provided fewer services to the poor, a Dalit-based party was more successful in the electoral mobilization of this group.

David Yang, Princeton University

his paper seeks to bring attention to the "class" component of many types of political transitions conventionally understood as driven by ethnic, nationalist mobilization. I argue that to the extent members of the popular classes are marginalized from the existing political/economic order, they adopt an anti-establishment stance although the exact outcome of their mobilization depends on the mode of articulation adopted by the counter-elite. When class and ethnic identities are closely intertwined, the symbols of ethnicity may prove highly effective in the mobilization of essentially class-based grievances. Focusing upon Taiwan’s experience in the critical period leading up to the initial opening of the political system, I argue that ethnicity itself was a class issue, precisely because it was the lower strata that were the most conscious of their ethnicity whereas the Taiwanese upper strata were far more successfully assimilated into the elite "national" culture. The successes of the political opposition, therefore, were driven not so much by the reassertion of Taiwanese ethnic identity as they were precipitated by the participatory demands of the popular sectors. In this sense, ethnic politics in Taiwan is a highly successful instrumentalist construction facilitated by the class structure of ethnicity in Taiwan's transitional society.