Chair: Patricia Martinez, Temple University

In the wake of the region-wide financial crisis that began in 1997, the interaction between Malaysia’s response to so-called "forces of globalization" (such as the flight of foreign capital) and its domestic politics has been distinctive: a selective economic nationalist disengagement from these "forces" combined, paradoxically, with a very public conflict over popular hegemony within its ruling elite. Although the disengagement has been successful in restoring stability and conditions for growth to the Malaysian economy, the crisis nonetheless has brought into public debate not only the cleavage between two factions within the ruling elite (one led by Prime Minister Mahathir, the other by his ex-Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrihim), but also their contrasting moral-political claims to legitimacy. Over the same period, under the rubric of "reformasi," previously excluded actors (such as ethnically- and religiously-based opposition groups) and new ones (such as womens’ movements and NGOs) from civil society have gained a new prominence within this factional struggle, and through their moral and political arguments have sought to redefine it to make new claims over the direction of Malaysian society. This panel focuses on two related questions: What are the distinctive features of Malaysia’s political crisis, compared to those of two other nation-states in the region—Singapore and Indonesia? What are the new movements, particularly among women, that now seek to transform Malaysian politics-as-usual by widening this elite-driven debate over Malaysia’s past, present, and future, and so shape the political process?

Khoo Boo Teik, Murdock University

The ruling elites of Malaysia and Singapore were once the most vigorous promoters of the idea that East Asia’s configurations of nationalism, capitalism, and corporatism (conveniently captured by the idea of ‘Asian values’) were their best strategy for managing encounters with ‘globalization.’ The July 1997 crisis, however, compelled very different responses from these elites though they both quickly saw it as a watershed in contemporary international political economy.

This paper explores Malaysia’s responses (which sparked political opposition and cultural dissent) and Singapore’s (which did not) to posit a comparative understanding of how globalization in its many guises could affect the political and economic bases of the legitimacy and hegemony of elites ruling over small Southeast Asian states. This situation is particularly problematic given that the economies of these two nation-states are highly integrated into the world capitalist system.

David Camroux, Institut d’Etudes Politiques

The 1997–1999 economic crisis in Southeast Asia would appear to have brought in its wake political changes of far-reaching significance. The fall of President Suharto in Indonesia and the legislative elections of June 1999 were undoubtedly the most significant of these developments. Yet Malaysia is different: whereas throughout Southeast Asia, political upheavals were the result of forces outside the governing regime, in Malaysia, in dismissing his heir apparent and number two, Anwar Ibrahim, Prime Minister Mohamed Mahathir would appear to have brought upon himself the political turbulence that has affected Malaysia since September 1998.

"Reformasi"—the name may be shared with the broad movement for political reform in Indonesia, but the Malaysian experience needs to be seen in a different light. The appeal to the "indigenous" and to the "universal" in particular has a unique resonance in the Malaysian case. Who are the true nationalists? Curious situation, when the emblematic symbol of reform, Anwar, has as his strength and weakness his acceptability in the "West." What are the reference points in a heteroclite opposition coalition: the defense of Islam and the Malays (PAS), the Chinese minority and social democracy (DAP) or that transversal value, "justice" (Parti Keadilan Nasional)?

This paper will attempt to tease out some of the differences within the Malaysian and Indonesian experience in dealing with the local and global dialectic.

Patricia Martinez, Temple University

In the midst of a growing political consciousness because of events beginning in September 1998 and the imperative that change must be wrought in Malaysia, a group of women and individuals from NGOs drafted a document encompassing various aspects of Malaysian public life—among them development, work, religion and culture, and sexuality—as the agenda that women wanted recognized in the anticipated new order and new millennium. The Women’s Agenda for Change was launched on 25 May 1999, and received overwhelming endorsement from more than 76 organizations including opposition political parties, trade unions, and NGOs. Within a few weeks of its launch, the government also asked to endorse the Agenda, in part because of its realization that women in Malaysia are now a force to be reckoned with, an electoral constituency long unrecognized.

This paper analyzes the Women’s Agenda for Change from the perspective of one of its authors. Two aspects are examined: (1) the ramifications of the document and its effect to date on a changing political landscape, including the fact that it is now the platform for a woman candidate standing in the forthcoming elections; and (2) the shortcomings of the Women’s Agenda for Change, in a critical reflection on the genealogies of power in speaking for and about women in Malaysia in the context of the nation’s defining fundamentals of race and religion.

Saliha Hassan, University of Malaysia