How do local people known as ethnic minorities make, maintain, and mediate connections with the larger political, cultural, and economic systems of which they form a part? How do the interactions with these larger entities shape the local context? What are the consequences for how people see and make themselves and their ethnic identity within these larger entities? How do individuals, households, or local groups negotiate their ways through changing political, economic, and cultural environments? This panel revisits and explores these questions from the perspectives of minority peoples in China and Thailand. Our view from the peripheries highlights the use of ethnic identities in negotiating a position within modern nation states, and the place of ethnicity in discourses of nation building, development, and modernization. Our papers draw on fieldwork in particular areas of both China and Thailand, and together set the stage for a discussion of the more general questions we raise. Shanshan Du examines the revival of Lahu traditional practices, and how political transformations has shaped Lahu identity. Charles Ettner looks at the ways in which modern Chinese educational practices affect She traditional knowledge and the consequences for She integration within the Chinese state. Magnus Fiskesjö and Kathleen Gillogly focus on the present-day role of traditional practices (home-brewed beer among the Wa, and Lisu New Year celebrations). Nicola Tannenbaum, our discussant, draws on research among the Tai Long of Thailand and reflects on the uses of ethnic identity and its transformations in the context of modern nation building.

Shanshan Du, Tulane University

In this paper, I will examine the historical processes in which the indigenous village organization of the Lancang Lahu—a Tibeto-Burman speaking people of Southwest China—have encountered the increasingly intensified control of the various local administration systems of the Chinese state. Mainly due to their ancestors’ constant rebellions, the Lahu who resided west of the Lancang (Mekong) River had maintained a large degree of local autonomy at the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), over six centuries after the state had inaugurated direct control over most of Yunnan Province. Since the KMT (1911–1949) implemented a strict local control system (lu-lin or bao-jia) in the 1930s, however, the indigenous Lahu village organization—consisting of their villagehead (qhatshie) system and religious institutions—has been greatly weakened. The Lancang Lahu began to be fully integrated into the local administration of the Chinese government since the founding of the PRC in 1949 and their village political organization has been greatly shaped by state policies, resembling those elsewhere in China. In particular, except for very limited areas where Lahu tradition have revived recently, the indigenous village organization of the Lancang Lahu has been completely replaced by the "production team" and "production brigade" under the commune system, further transformed into "village small group" and "administrative village" since the dissolution of communes in the post Mao era. During the process of political integration over the last two centuries, the ethnic identity of the Lancang Lahu has been increasingly integrated into the identity of Chinese citizenship.

Kathleen Gillogly, University of Michigan

Among the panoply of ‘hilltribe’ tourist attractions in northern Thailand is Lisu New Year, celebrated at the time of the Chinese lunar New Year. It is marked by all-night dancing, drinking, and courtship over the course of several days. It is more than a party, however; for Lisu, it is a series of rituals that express key symbols. First, it is a means by which they present uniquely Lisu values to themselves, especially the young. This has become increasingly significant as the young move to town for school and work. Second, given the ethnic diversity of their social environment, it is a stage on which Lisu present their ethnic identity. Third, on a less examined level, the New Year celebrations are an occasion on which Lisu recall their history as elders discuss the origins of the rituals being performed. That history is one of living at the periphery of empires, avoiding political control while participating in those economies and cultures, and of migration and thus contact with varied societies from Eastern Tibet down to Thailand. Still other, more recent, practices have been negotiated in the context of modern Lisu life in Thailand, particularly the attraction of New Year celebrations to Thai and foreign tourists. How Lisu New Year is constituted and performed illustrates the complexity of ethnic identity for these Lisu people.

Charles Ettner, Stanford University

During the Chinese civil war of the 1940s, the Chinese Communists solicited the aid and support of minority peoples by courting them with promises of building together a new and better China, of working side by side as equals, of economic assistance, modern technology, and education for their people. This paper focuses particularly on the latter of these promises. Education was never missing from She nationality social culture as they had developed a very elaborate system of singing practices that covered history, language, farming, propriety, and much more. However, as China opened its doors and set into motion a new modernization policy, the Chinese government began re-focusing efforts on promoting formal education as one of the key elements for gaining access to a modern China and, especially, to the many benefits it is promised to bring. Drawing upon my 1995 fieldwork amongst the She people in Xiapu county (Fujian province), I examine the impact of Chinese formal education on She identity, cultural practices and social institutions. Particularly problematic is how Han Chinese education is effectually replacing rather than adding to a wealth of She historical knowledge, the She language, their sociocultural practices, and more. Adding to the problem is the rising cost of formal education, increasingly prohibitive for She families, and yet they believe—inspired by the government—it critical to their children’s futures. A third issue is the questionable value of such formal education in a region with little industry or business and so economically depressed.

Magnus Fiskesjö, University of Chicago