Organizer: Bonnie B. C. Oh, Georgetown University
Chair and Discussant: Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago
Discussant: John R. Merrill, U.S. State Department
The American Military Government (known as USAMGIK, United States Army Military Government in Korea, 1945–1948) was the crucible of two contradictory political traditions in contemporary Korea—democracy and authoritarianism. The Republic of Korea, which marked its 50th anniversary in 1998, was launched after three years of USAMGIK administration, primarily at the insistence of and with the support of the United States. What transpired during these three years on the Korean peninsula has made a huge impression on Korea, including the "permanent" division of the peninsula—and continues to shape its future. And yet, this period in Korean history is relatively unknown, little studied, and has produced few English-language works. Most Americans are not even aware, according to Bruce Cumings, of "the U.S. occupation, in which Americans operated a full military government from 1945–1948" (Cumings, 1997, 185).
The policies of the United States toward Korea following World War II were guided primarily by its foreign policy imperatives, especially to halt Communism in East Asia. The USAMGIK supported the rightists and could not recognize the only pre-existing, identifiable Korean group, called the Korean People’s Republic, for it was politically left-leaning although it enjoyed majority Korean support. The Cold War had already arrived on the Korean soil. Anti-Communist policies of the U.S. did not automatically bring democracy to South Korea, merely because it was anti-Communist and American inspired and implemented. Instead, it led to a series of popular uprisings, which were brutally suppressed, thus "inviting" Communist support of the rebels, leading to a vicious circle of more severe persecution, further alienation of the people, and an intensification of the authoritarian nature of the central government, the American Military Government.
When the American authorities turned the power over to the new Republic of Korea in 1948, they bequeathed to Koreans a government more centralized and authoritarian than even the Japanese predecessor—and no less inclined to suppress anti-government elements movements and popular unrest.
The proposed panel examines the American Military Government period in Korea from both external and domestic situations and perspectives. Two papers on external forces that shaped Korea’s future will precede the analyses of domestic conditions because the factors extrinsic to Korea, such as the circumstances of the Cold War world politics and the policies of the U.S. military officials had decisively impacted on Korea’s domestic orientation. Dealing with Korea’s internal situation will be one joint-paper with two parts on the moderate political groups of both the left and right of the center. Studies on Korean moderates are even rarer than those dealing with the American Military Government for they had challenged the group in power which was supported by the U.S. and were therefore branded Communist. According to E. Grant Meade, "serious faults lay in the ignorance and rightist conditioning of the Americans" (Meade, 1951). The panel hopes to fill the gap in the study of this critical period in Korean history to offer more objective and critical analyses that the distance makes it possible.
The Coming of the Cold War to Korea and Interactions of Domestic and International Forces
William W. Stueck, University of Georgia
When scholars use the label "Cold War" they are generally referring to the condition of extreme tension between the United States and the Soviet Union that emerged after World War II. This condition rendered impossible the successful negotiation of fundamental issues and in several places along the Soviet periphery made the outbreak of military conflict a constant prospect. Korea became the first place in which such a conflict involving the armed forces of one of the principals in the Cold War and a proxy of the other actually occurred.
This paper will analyze the combination of international and domestic forces that brought the Cold War to Korea between 1945 and 1948 in a manner unlikely to produce stability without a shooting war. The methodology will be comparative, with the cases of Germany and Austria, the two other multipower occupations of the post-World War II era, examined in search of reasons as to why the Cold War came to Korea and in such a volatile manner. The Cold War never engulfed Austria while it was intense in Germany but never involved a major shooting war. Why was Korea so different? The paper will emphasize international forces without ignoring their interaction with domestic conditions.
Bunce and Jacobs: U.S. Occupation Advisors in Korea, 1946–1947
James I. Matray, New Mexico State University
This paper will assess the performance of two civilian government advisors in the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) during the years 1946–1947. Arthur C. Bunce arrived in southern Korea as economic advisor in February 1946, having previously served as the chief agricultural economist on the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board. Joseph E. Jacobs became political advisor to the occupation commander in June 1947, after serving in the U.S. Embassy in Albania. The paper will first compare and contrast the professional background and political assumptions of each man, focusing attention on identifying strengths and weaknesses as an occupation advisor. It will then describe the role that Bunce and Jacobs played in the U.S. policy shift from seeking cooperation with the Soviets to achieve reunification to pursuing the creation of a separate government in the southern part of Korea.
This paper will analyze in detail how and why Bunce and Jacobs differed in their assessments and recommendations regarding developments in Korea. It will also evaluate the wisdom of each man’s advice and explain why Jacobs, rather than Bunce, would have greater impact on U.S. occupation policy. This will provide key insights into the U.S. decision to accept partition of the peninsula as the only answer to the Soviet-American impasse in Korea. The paper will complement directly the paper on the panel discussing Yo Un-hyong (Lyuh Woon-hyung) and Kim Kyu-sik, since Bunce and Jacobs had regular contacts with and firm views about the ability and activity of these two Korean leaders. It will also explore their relationship as civilian government advisors with U.S. military officials. Finally, the paper will assess whether Bunce or Jacobs had a better grasp of how Korea should fit into post-War U.S. security planning in East Asia.
Campaign for Coalition Government: Efforts of Moderate Right and Moderate Left
Bonnie B. C. Oh, Georgetown University; Sang Sook Jeon, Ewha Women’s University
This joint paper by Bonnie B. C. Oh and Sang Sook Jeon will examine the efforts of the moderate right and left political figures of Kim Kyu-sik and Yo Un-hyong (known also as Lyuh Woon-hyung) to form a coalition government during the United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK), 1945–1948.
After heady jubilant days of liberation from Japanese rule in August 1945, Koreans were to be bitterly disappointed to learn of the U.S. proposal to establish trusteeship in Korea and with the de facto division of the country. When these problems and extreme political ideological groupings persisted, moderate intellectuals in the middle emerged to bring together various factions in the south and leaders from north and south together. Two most prominent of the moderates were Kim Kyu-sik on the right and Yo Un-hyong on the left. They attempted to form a united interim government for all of the peninsula, a government that could be recognized by the world powers and one that could solve the impending problems, including the trusteeship question.
These moderate efforts were very important. It was a campaign to prevent the permanent division of the nation and to establish an independent, sovereign state. But in the climate of the Cold War politics of the world, the moderate movement was overly idealistic and had little chance to run the course even with the support of USAMGIK. One is tempted to speculate what the outcome would have been: could Korea’s most serious problems of the time, which still remain to this day, have been solved? We hope to shed some light on these questions, as we explore the accomplishments and shortcomings of these two moderate political leaders during the American Military Government period. Oh will discuss Kim Kyu-sik’s role and Jeon will discuss Yo Un-hyon’s.