Organizer and Chair: Kongdan Oh, Institute for Defense Analyses
Discussant: Scott Snyder, United States Institute of Peace
Since the end of the Cold War, prospects for Korean unification have improved. Political scientists and economists have begun to direct their attention to mapping out unification scenarios and calculating unification costs, but relatively few studies have turned their attention to the role that the major powers of Northeast Asia should or will play in unification.
Part of this neglect may be attributed to the fact that in the post-Cold War era social scientists are still searching for a new international relations paradigm to replace the bilateral balance of power paradigm that accounted for the division of Korea. Another explanation for the neglect is that each of the major powers has been preoccupied with making its own adjustments to a post-Cold War reality and has not devoted attention to the possibility of further changes in the international political landscape. Consideration of Korean unification has been left to the Koreans themselves, with the South Koreans overwhelmed by the problems that unification would bring and the North Koreans doing everything they can to prevent unification.
Although it may be politically convenient to leave the question of unification to Koreans, the impact of a unification on the major powers, in whatever form that unification might take, will be undeniable. Our panel brings together experts from China, Russia, Japan and the United States to discuss how each of these nations views unification from the standpoint of its own domestic concerns, and what roles and responsibilities each country might take in the Korean unification process.
Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Harvard University
This paper will address Russia’s role in Korean unification in terms of three factors. First, a consideration of Russia’s historical relations with Korea. Second, an accounting of bilateral developments between Russia and the two Koreas since the normalization of relations between the former Soviet Union and the ROK in 1991. Third, an analysis of Russia’s position on Korean unification, considering the strategic importance of Korea for Russia. With these three factors as background, the paper will then outline the potential role that Russia can play in preserving stability on the Korean peninsula and facilitating a peaceful unification process.
William M. Drennan, National Defense University
The goals of U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, proceeding from the solid foundations of the U.S.-ROC alliance, are to build a durable peace and to facilitate progress toward a Korean unification. In order to foster stability and promote a process of change that remains manageable and peaceful, the U.S. has called for building positive relations—between South and North and between the U.S. and the DPRK—that compliment and move beyond deterrence.
The U.S. objective is not to prop up the Pyongyang regime, nor to seek its collapse. The U.S. shares South Korea’s stated goal of a reunified peninsula that contributes to peace and stability in the region. Those who suspect that the U.S. has adopted a "Two Korea" policy confuse means with ends. U.S. engagement of North Korea does not seek to prolong division; rather, the objective of U.S. engagement of North Korea is to help create conditions conducive to reconciliation and reunification.
No one knows how long it will take the two Koreas to establish a level of trust sufficient to arrive at a negotiated settlement, or if such a settlement is even possible, but as long as deterrence and the Agreed Framework hold, there are huge advantages to a carefully managed approach, especially in light of the alternatives. This paper will explore the unique role of the U.S.—as South Korea’s staunch ally and North Korea’s interlocutor of choice—has to play in Korean unification.
Michael J. Green, Council on Foreign Relations
This paper will examine Japan’s changing perspectives on the Korean peninsula and future role in the event of contingencies or eventual reunification of North and South Korea. The paper will review the growth of Japanese acceptance of a security role—in cooperation with the United States—in the maintenance of deterrence and readiness on the Korean peninsula. The paper will assess Japanese objectives for relations with the Korean peninsula in the future. Finally, the paper will examine possible Japanese responses (based on contemporary Japanese analysis) to scenarios for collapse, explosion, or muddling-through in the North.
Fei-ling Wang, Georgia Institute of Technology
This paper explores the interests and intentions of the PRC in Northeast Asia in general and concerning the issue of Korean unification in particular. Conservative and low profile as Beijing appears, China nonetheless has a vital stake in the future of the Korean peninsula and has played a major (sometimes even decisive) role to affect the intra-Korea relationship. Supporting a peaceful unification of Korea in principle, Beijing would probably prefer a status quo in the near future. As the PRC becomes stronger, however, Beijing may adopt different views and policies. Yet a desire of minimizing the risks or shocks associated with a Korean unification seems to be unwavering. The key factors that may influence Beijing’s views and policies are likely to be the overall Sino-American relations, the progress of China’s own unification with Taiwan, Sino-Japanese relations, and the continuation of military ties between a unifying Korea and the United States.