Organizer: Qiang Zhai, Auburn University, Montgomery
Chair: Sandra C. Taylor, University of Utah
Discussant: David Anderson, University of Indianapolis
The Vietnam War was not just a conflict between the United States and North Vietnam. It also involved the allies of both countries. The interests, fears, and ambitions of those allies inevitably affected both the course of the war and the ability of the major contestants to achieve their objectives. While the relationship between Washington and its allies during the Vietnam War has been examined extensively, the inter-party contact on the Communist side remains little studied due to the lack of Communist sources in the past. In the last few years, however, new documentary evidence has emerged from the long-closed archives in China and the former Soviet Union. The new material makes it possible to reconstruct the concerns, calculations, and motivations of the Communist participants in the Vietnam War and the interactions between Hanoi and its principal allies. The three papers in this panel will use new Chinese and Soviet materials to discuss Beijing's and Moscow's perception of and policy toward the Indochina conflict, the extent of Chinese and Soviet material assistance to the North Vietnamese, Sino-Soviet differences over approaches to the war and peace settlement of the conflict, and China's involvement in the secret war in Laos. This panel represents an international collaboration in examining the Indochina conflict and seeks to contribute to the emerging international history of the Vietnam War.
China's Attitude Toward Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965-1968
Qiang Zhai, Auburn University, Montgomery
The Johnson administration's escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1965 triggered strong domestic criticism. Responding to public pressure, President Johnson made a number of peace overtures to Hanoi. The escalation of the conflict in Indochina Asia also drew serious attention around the world. Efforts were made by various countries to promote a peaceful solution to the Indochina problem. Thus, the war in Vietnam was intertwined with a series of peace initiatives made not only by Washington, but also by Moscow, London, Paris, and a number of British commonwealth capitals. How did leaders in Beijing perceive these initiatives? Why were they so consistent and firm in opposing them? How did Beijing's approach to peace settlement of the war differ from those of Hanoi and Moscow? What were the effects of Beijing's opposition strategy on China's relations with the US, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam? This paper uses newly released Chinese sources to answer these questions.
Between 1965 and 1968, Beijing provided extensive assistance to Hanoi in weapons, equipment as well as support troops. China was determined to help Ho Chi Minh to win the war against the Americans. Beijing's opposition to Vietnam peace initiatives reflected Chinese leaders' distrust of American and Soviet intentions. It also constituted an important part of Mao's general efforts to demonstrate China's anti-imperialist credentials among Third World countries, to establish Beijing's leadership position within the Asian-African nationalist movement, to combat Soviet revisionist foreign policy, and to mobilize domestic support for his social and political programs.
Soviet-North Vietnamese Military Cooperation and the Conflict in Indochina
Ilya Gaiduk, Russian Academy of Sciences
Soviet-North Vietnamese military cooperation was an integral part of relations between the two countries throughout the years of conflict in Indochina. Although during the first Indochina war the Soviet Union remained mostly on the sidelines, Moscow did provide occasional support to the Vietnamese Communists with arms and ammunition. According to some reports, the Soviet missile complexes KATYUSHA demonstrated their effectiveness at Dien Bien Phu. At that time, however, Beijing played the role of principal supplier of military equipment to Ho Chi Minh. The situation changed only slightly after the 1954 Geneva Conference. Despite Hanoi's insistent requests to the Soviet leaders about developing closer military cooperation, Moscow followed the policy of delegating the primary responsibility in supporting the Vietnamese Communists to Beijing, thus avoiding the transformation of the Vietnam problem into a stumbling block in its relations with the West. Only after Washington had directly intervened in the war in Vietnam, with China openly defying Moscow's position in the world communist movement, did the Soviet leaders change their attitude of restraint with respect to Vietnam. During the last months of 1964 and the first quarter of 1965, a number of agreements were signed between Moscow and Hanoi on Soviet aid to North Vietnam. Gradually, Moscow became the principal supplier of modern weaponry and equipment to Hanoi, while China lagged behind the Soviet Union in the amount of aid to North Vietnam. During the Vietnam War, military cooperation between the two countries developed in various spheres, including the training of North Vietnamese military cadres in the Soviet Union, the participation of Soviet advisers in combat operations in Vietnam, and the examination of samples of captured American weapons by Soviet experts. These Soviet efforts represent the most controversial aspect of Soviet policy toward the Vietnam War, particularly if one takes into account Moscow's desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.
A Secret War: China's Involvement in Laos, 1963-1975
Xiaoming Zhang, Texas A & M International University
China played an important, but secret, role in Laos during the conflict between the North Vietnamese and Americans for the control of Indochina. Due to the lack of access to Chinese sources, however, little of China's involvement in Laos has been known. In the past few years, new Chinese materials have become available to shed light on Beijing's role in the Vietnam War. As the continuation of an earlier study dealing with China's involvement with the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1969, this paper aims to examine China's role in Laos during the Indochina conflict. China's interest in Laos began at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Only after U.S. escalation of the war in South Vietnam in the early 1960s did China's involvement in Laos became substantial. Beijing not only provided significant material assistance to the Laotian national liberation movement, but also sent an advisory group and military troops to assist the Pathet Lao's war efforts against the United States and the Vientiane regime. Because of the special relationship between the Pathet Lao and the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi, China's involvement in Laos was bound for rivalry with the North Vietnamese. The paper pays particular attention to an analysis of Beijing-Hanoi competition over Laos. It argues that the special relationship between the Pathet Laos and Hanoi prevented China from having a more significant role in Laos. Thus, China's experience in Laos produced more frustration than success.