Organizer and Chair: Jane Geaney, University of Chicago
Discussant: Roger T. Ames, University of Hawaii
The cross cultural study of sense discrimination is an untapped resource for comparative studies. The metaphors and models of sense discrimination in the classical Chinese tradition have yet to be systematically explored. The papers in this panel address several areas of correspondence between classical Chinese theories of sensation and theories of politics (relations between rulers and ruled). Jane Geaney's paper analyzes fundamental differences between Chinese and Western accounts of sensation including the relation of the heart-mind to the senses and its difference from the Western mind/body problem. The other two papers pursue specific aspects of the relation of the heart-mind and the senses. Paul Kjellberg's paper uses the epistemology behind mind/sense to elucidate Mencius' politics. Lisa Raphals' paper takes an opposite direction, and uses Xunzi's politics to account for his epistemology.
Body, Mind, and Senses in Ancient Chinese Thought
Jane Geaney, University of Chicago
Mind/body problems in Western philosophy stem from the way the mind is conceived as radically other than the body. Sinologists generally agree that classical China lacked such a mind/body dichotomy. This paper will attempt a partial explanation for the lack of mind/body problem in classical China through an analysis of the mind's relation to the senses. My hypothesis is that in classical Chinese texts the heart-mind is closer to being one of the senses than is its Western counterpart (the mind), which is divorced from the senses as well as the body.
Chinese views of sense discrimination differed from traditional Western view of the 'five senses' in several ways. First, although classical Chinese thinkers agreed that the body had five senses, they disagreed as to what they were. In contrast to Western lists of sense processes usually ending with 'touch,' the Chinese texts often end their lists of senses with the heart-mind itself or the 'form' of the body. Second, Western accounts of sensation center on the validity of perception as a means to knowledge; Chinese texts more frequently treat sensation as the cause of desires. In Chinese accounts of 'knowing' the ears and eyes play the greatest role; by contrast, the Western emphasis is on touch and the senses as a whole. I will argue that we can infer from these differences that the mind/senses distinction was not as clearly drawn in classical China and the heart-mind resembled a sensory function.
Virtuous Reality: Sense Discrimination in Xunzi
Lisa Raphals, Bard College
According to Xunzi, knowledge begins with the senses. We rely upon the senses to make distinctions, but only insofar as they are governed by the overall understanding of the mind, which provides the correct interpretations of sounds, visual forms, etc. (Xunzi 22). This is one of several accounts in which a ruler uses overall understanding or expertise to rule subordinates. Rulers also control practices of naming to achieve social order (Xunzi 22), and anticipate disorder and regulate their states before the onset of discord (Xunzi 3). Teachers use the collective expertise of the Classics to regulate morality through education and practice (Xunzi 1) and instill the sense of duty that distinguishes humans from animals (Xunzi 9). Sense perception, then, is only one of many subordinates ruled by knowledge. These views of education are directed toward learners of texts, or at least users of names; Xunzi does not emphasize the importance of education, or training the senses, in early childhood. It has been noted that Xunzi theories of the origin of human society do not fully account for the wisdom of the original sages. The maternal instruction stories of the Lien zhuan provide a very different account of moral development and the training of sense perception. They attribute the expertise of sage kings and their ministers to early childhood, possibly even pre-natal, instruction by their mothers, who established their moral dispositions and skills early in life.
Sense Discrimination in the Mencius
Paul Kjellberg, Whittier College
In 6A15, Mencius distinguishes the senses, which cannot think and so are obsessed by things, and the mind, which can think and so succeeds. The senses are not fallacious so much as limited by their ability to appreciate only one aspect of human life. The virtue of the mind lies in its ability to appreciate the over-all good in a way that the individual senses cannot. In 3A4, Mencius uses similar language to distinguish between "great people," who deserve to rule, and "small people," who deserve to be ruled. Though this distinction is initially repugnant to our modern democratic sensibilities, the analogy to 6A15 suggests an interpretation according to which Mencius' reasoning here is quite plausible. There happen to be some people who, for whatever reasons, are better able to appreciate the interests of all concerned than are others who are forced by circumstance to focus primarily on their own survival. Those who are best able to appreciate the interests of all concerned, he concludes, are the ones who ought to make decisions for the society as a whole. Understanding the relationship between the rulers and the ruled on this model does several things for us. It clarifies Mencius' notions of "thinking" and of "benevolence." It explains the reasoning behind Mencius' validation of an apparently inequitable political system. It elucidates a simple yet distinctive epistemological and moral model that was subsequently taken for granted. And it raises some interesting questions for us in the present.