Organizer: Hong Nack Kim, West Virginia University
Chair: Young C. Kim, George Washington University
Discussants: Hang Yul Rhee, Shepherd College; Young C. Kim, George
Washington University
This panel is organized to examine change and continuity in North Korea's foreign policy toward the United States, Japan, China, and Russia since the death of Kim Il-Sung in July 1994.
In addition to analyzing major issues in North Korea's relations with the four major powers, it will discuss some significant change in North Korea's attitudes and policy toward the United States, Japan, China, and Russia under the Kim Jong-Il regime. More specifically, it intends to examine the factors which have been influencing the new North Korean regime to adopt a more pragmatic and flexible policy toward major powers, particularly the United States and Japan, since the death of Kim Il-Sung. In addition, it will also analyze the Kim Jong-Il regime's more pragmatic approach to the People's Republic of China.
Lastly, it is designed to assess the implication of such change in North Korean foreign policy, not only for the peace and security of Northeast Asia, but also for the future of North-South Korean relations, including the problem of Korean reunification.
North Korean-United States Relations After Kim Il-Sung
B. C. Koh, University of Illinois, Chicago
From North Korea's vantage point, one of the most noteworthy developments in its external relations in recent years has been the initiation of high-level dialogue with the United States. Although the dialogue began in June 1993 when Kim Il Sung was still alive, its most significant intermediate outcome-namely, the signing of an "agreed framework" on the nuclear issue-did not materialize until October 1994, three months after Kim's death.
The priority Pyongyang placed on the dialogue reflected a fundamental reassessment of the United States in North Korea's strategic calculus. Simply put, faced with a sharp deterioration in its strategic environment, Pyongyang concluded that the U.S. did not really pose a threat to its security but could actually be utilized as an asset with which to bolster its security. The verbal "negative security guarantee" North Korea obtained from the U.S.-i.e., the latter's commitment not to use force, including nuclear weapons, against the former-was but one, albeit symbolically significant, component of the overall package. The other components included: (1) the provision of light-water reactors (LWRs); (2) the provision of heavy oil; (3) an exchange of liaison offices; and (4) the phased removal of restrictions on trade, investment, and telecommunications.
One major complicating factor in all this, from Pyongyang's standpoint, was the role South Korea was to play directly in the LWR project and indirectly in the other areas. For the bulk of the financing, perhaps 75% of it, for the LWR project, would come from Seoul. Seoul would also provide and install the reactors in the North, which would necessitate an influx of hundreds, perhaps thousands of South Korean engineers, technicians, and other personnel. Pyongyang's fear of adverse political fall-out from all this would operate and continues to operate as a major stumbling block in the implementation of the LWR project.
If North Korea had its way, it would deal only with the U.S., bypassing South Korea altogether. The strength of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, in which, thanks to its growing economic power, South Korea is no longer a client state but an equal partner, ensures that Washington and Seoul would present a united front vis-à-vis Pyongyang. How to fashion a policy that comes to grips with this reality while safeguarding its systemic integrity will remain the foremost challenge confronting the post-Kim Il-Sung leadership.
North Korean-Japanese Relations After Kim Il-Sung
Hong Nack Kim, West Virginia University
After nearly a half-century of diplomatic estrangement and abnormality, North Korea and Japan embarked on a series of negotiations for the purpose of normalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries from September 1990. Despite the initial euphoria and optimism expressed by political leaders of both countries regarding the prospects for early normalizations, the talks between Pyongyang and Tokyo have been suspended since November 1992 due to a number of thorny issues, including Pyongyang's refusal to accept international inspection of its nucelar facilities.
Following Kim Il-Sung's death in July 1994, North Korea has stepped up its efforts to normalize relations with Japan by taking a more flexible approach. As a result, it has not only improved its relations with Japan in general, but also enhanced the possibility of normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan in the near future.
The purpose of this paper is to examine North Korea's foreign policy toward Japan under the Kim Jong-Il regime since the death of Kim Il-Sung with emphasis on the analysis of the North Korean new regime's approach to the problem of normalizing relations with Japan. It is a major contention of this paper that the new regime is more pragmatic in its approach to Japan than its predecessor and that the prospect for the normalization of Pyongyang-Tokyo diplomatic relations has improved significantly, for the new regime is anxious to secure capital and technology from Japan to overcome North Korea's economic stagnation.
North Korean-Chinese Relations Under Kim Jong-Il
Il-Pyong J. Kim, University of Connecticut
This paper analyzes the strains and stresses that have developed in China's relations with North Korea following the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992, and also discusses the changing relations between North Korea and China since the death of Kim Il-Sung in July, 1994.
Kim Jong-I1 has not formally succeeded his father's leadership position as the General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party and the President of the DPRK. However, he is likely to take up the leadership position in October or before the end of 1995 since a mourning period of one year has passed.
The relations between North Korea and China under Kim Jong Il will be improved considerably as the younger Kim is likely to follow the Chinese model of reform and open door policy when he takes up the leadership position this year. Thus the Chinese posture toward the two Koreas will continue to maintain the equidistance policy.
Russian-North Korean Relations from the Gorbachev Era to the Present
Jane Shapiro Zacek, Union College
Soviet policy toward North Korea began to shift notably in 1988, when the USSR announced that it would participate in the Seoul Olympic Games. At much the same time, Soviet interest in rapidly improving economic and trade relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK-South Korea) became apparent. The South Korean government made known that it was willing to provide substantial credits which the Soviets could use to buy badly-needed consumer goods.
In September 1990, Moscow and Seoul established diplomatic relations, much to the displeasure of the government in Pyongyang. Yet, the following year, the long-standing USSR-North Korean security treaty was renewed. It should also be noted that soon after Gorbachev acceded to power, the Soviets expressed great interest in the pacific-Asia area as a whole and declared their intention to become a major regional player. This was a major policy shift, as earlier Soviet interests focused primarily on relations with China, North Korea, and Japan.
After the collapse of the USSR, the newly independent Russian Federation understandably focused on internal affairs. But by the end of 1992, it was evident that the Yeltsin government would continue Soviet policies toward the north Pacific and the major countries therein, including the two Koreas. The Russian government has continued to insist upon North Korean repayment of its considerable debt only by agreed-upon commodities or in hand currency.
The paper concludes with an assessment of Russian-North Korean relations since the 1994 death of Kim Il-Sung.