Organizer: Anne L. Emig, Columbia University
Chair: Susan J. Pharr, Harvard University
Discussant: Robert M. Uriu, Columbia University
Japan's leadership in Asia has been the subject of considerable debate in academic, policy, and journalistic circles for the past decade. Despite growing acceptance of Japan's role as a leader in Asia, we lack systematic understanding of what leadership is and how it is exercised. International relations theory offers little assistance, lacking a clear definition of the concept.
Our notions of leadership, such as they are, tend to be extrapolated from the behavior, strategy and style of the United States during the Cold War. We tend to assume that leadership is high profile, based on discrete, clearly articulated goals, and backed by a strong military. Such assumptions bias judgments against Japan and ignore the possibility of alternative approaches.
The proposed panel aims to strengthen our understanding of leadership by examining the nature and consequences of Japan's growing role in East Asia. The panel focuses on three key analytical questions. First, how and to what extent does Japan demonstrate leadership in the region? Second, what are the opportunities for and constraints on Japanese leadership in East Asia? Third, how do the requirements and attributes of leadership vary across issue areas?
Exploring cases ranging from security to the environment to development to trade and investment, the panel identifies areas in which Japan has been relatively effective as a leader and others where its efforts have been limited and/or ineffective. Two common themes are the prevalence of domestic institutional constraints on activist leadership and a resulting preference for multilateral approaches.
Yen for the Earth: Japan's Pro-active China Environmental Policy
Susan J. Pharr, Harvard University; Ming Wan, Harvard University
Japan today leads global efforts to avert environmental damage from rapid economic development in China. Through environmental aid, joint demonstration projects and other programs, Japan has committed over $1.8 billion since 1988 for this purpose; in contrast, even a modest $52 million U.S. government proposal to aid China failed to win approval.
Many factors would lead us to expect Japan to abjure a leadership role in addressing Chinese environmental ills: (1) According to most observers, Japan is a "reactive" or "defensive" state. (2) Unlike other China issues on which Western nations have sought Japan's cooperation, incentives for cooperating on the environment are weak. (3) Japan resists international pressure to cooperate when targeted governments resist, and it is clear that China has been skeptical of developed-country pressures to give priority to the environment over developmental goals. (4) Despite some worry about transborder acid rain, environmental problems that arise in China do not greatly affect Japan. (5) There is relatively weak public support in Japan for addressing international environmental concerns.
Nevertheless, Japan has adopted a pro-active China environment policy Why is this? First, international cooperation on environmental issues has created an incentive system in which the rewards to Japan for cooperating in Asia overcome its reluctance. Second, there has been Chinese support for a Japanese leadership role. Third and crucially, key Japanese ministries have, for their own reasons, made addressing Chinese environmental problems a high priority while politicians support leadership on the environment as an important component of Japan's international burden-sharing agenda.
Abnormal State or Civilian Power: Japan's Potential Influence on Regional
Security
Sheila A. Smith, Boston University
More than other issues considered on this panel, Japan's ability to assume a leadership role in the area of regional security seems problematic because of the weakness of domestic institutions, namely the military. This paper will examine how this organization of state institutions affects external policy and its implementation.
Two contrasting views of the postwar Japanese state have emerged with respect to its status in international politics. The first sees Japan as an "abnormal state"-one that has thus far not translated its economic power into commensurate military capability. The second treats Japan as a new type of power-a "civilian power"-suggesting the transformative potential of Japan's experience. Underlying both of these depictions of the postwar Japanese state are broader assumptions about the nature of influence on international politics and the utility of military power.
Three cases in which Japan sought to influence international security will be examined. The first case looks at efforts by the Japanese state to exert influence on the Western security alliance dialogue during the cold war: the negotiations over the INF treaty. The second case will focus on Japan's efforts at conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Cambodia. Finally, the paper will examine Japan's role in the creation of a regional security dialogue, and the broader effort at institution building within the region.
Economic Multilateralism, Japanese Style
Danny Unger, Georgetown University
Japanese academics, officials and politicians have actively worked to create regional economic institutions throughout the postwar period. Japan first worked to create an Asian group through which the United States might extend postwar economic assistance. Japan was the key actor in creating the Asian Development Bank and tried to use the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to foster economic and political cooperation between capitalist and communist states in Southeast Asia in the 1970s. And Japan was active in launching the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group and extending ASEAN's purview to include security issues.
The development of effective regional economic institutions in East Asia may help to dampen conflict as the region adjusts to fundamental economic and political structural changes in the next century. Japan will have to play a central role in any such developments. This paper will explore factors that tend to either encourage or impede Japanese leadership in promoting regional institutions. Among these are Japan's diplomatic and negotiating "styles," the domestic factors that constrain the emergence of a powerful Japanese prime minister, and Japan's interests in fostering Asia-Pacific multilateralism as a means of coping with the emergence of a great Chinese power and a possible shift in the nature of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In particular, the paper will review the alleged advantages of international regimes (reducing transaction costs, fostering convergent expectations) in promoting cooperation and consider how appropriate Japanese institutions are to these tasks.
Japan's Intellectual Contribution in Development
Anne L. Emig, Columbia University
The realm of ideas is not one we traditionally associate with Japan in international relations. Even in the area of development where Japan leads the world in resource commitments, Tokyo has long been considered a 'silent partner' (Goto 1992), its massive financial contributions unmatched by similar commitment of manpower or ideas.
This paper examines the origin and impact of Japan's 'intellectual contribution' in development, focusing particular attention on what we learn about the intellectual component of leadership from Japan's experience. The analysis focuses on three aspects of the contribution in East Asia. First, it examines a debate with the World Bank over financial sector adjustment in the Philippines, a debate that led to the Bank's East Asian Miracle report. Second, the paper looks at the ODA Charter, which specifies more clearly than ever before the type of developing country policies the Japanese government supports. Finally, on the operational side, the paper examines the rising share of technical assistance to support 'soft' aid, including Japanese policy advisors in Asian developing countries.
I argue that Japan's impressive economic development experience has created demand for Japanese intellectual input on development issues. From a supply perspective, however, Tokyo has come only lately to believe that it is in its interest to promote Japan's experience and ideas on development. Over time, resource commitments appear to create incentive for self-generated ideas. Yet Japan's domestic institutions continue to act as a constraint on idea-motivated policy.