Organizer and Chair: Kwong-loi Shun, University of California, Berkeley
Discussant: Thomas A. Metzger, Hoover Institution
Early Confucianism has often been discussed in terms of a distinction between the "inner" and the "outer." The distinction can be construed in different ways and applied to different aspects of early Confucian thought. The four papers discuss the distinction in relation to four issues: the relation between jen and li in the Analects (Chong), the attitude toward ming in the Analects and the Mencius (Shun), political thought in the Mencius (Huang), and the relation between duty and consequence in the Mencius (Pan). The papers together discuss whether, and if so in what sense, the distinction can be applied to early Confucian thought. The "inner-outer" distinction has also been invoked in discussions of Neo-Confucianism, and early Confucian thought has sometimes been interpreted from a Neo-Confucian perspective. The discussant (Metzger) will comment on the four papers and relate them to the way the distinction is understood in discussions of Neo-Confucianism.
Together, the four papers and the comments will illustrate different ways of construing the "inner-outer" distinction, and show how applicability of the distinction depends on the aspect of Confucian thought under consideration. In doing so, they help further our understanding of early Confucian thought as well as its differences from Neo-Confucianism. By including participants from different academic communities and disciplines, it is also hoped that interaction between participants with different backgrounds will stimulate fruitful discussions at the meeting.
Li and Jen in the Analects and the Inner-Outer Dichotomy
Kim-chong Chong, National University of Singapore
What exactly is the "inner-outer" distinction as applied to the ethical concerns of the Analects? How useful is it to understanding certain concepts in this text? This paper attempts an answer in terms of the relations between li and jen. Recent interpretations of li have emphasized its spirit, i.e., the emotions and attitudes as the source of (and not merely accompanying) its performance. Some writers seem to have further associated these with jen. In this regard, jen also seems to have an importance as the ultimate guide in determining yi, commonly translated as righteousness. Others have emphasized jen as a return to li as ceremony. Thus, Fingarette's interpretation of li has generated much controversy. Sometimes, emphasis on the "inner" seems to mean (merely) a complaint that emotions and attitudes in the Analects have been left out in the focus on ceremony. But perhaps the criticism is that certain emotions and attitudes have a greater role to play in the determination of virtues. If so, what are these emotions and attitudes and what are their virtues? How may characterizing them as "inner" help to understand their ethical role? On the other hand, if the correct emphasis is on ceremonial form, in what sense may this be called "outer"? Analysis of the relations between li and jen may suggest no simple "inner-outer" dichotomy and the importation of distinctions from mid-20th century western philosophy, with different concerns, may not have been entirely appropriate.
The Early Confucian Attitude Toward Ming
Kwong-loi Shun, University of California, Berkeley
The paper examines the early Confucian attitude toward ming as reflected in the Analects and the Mencius. It argues that this attitude is primarily one of willing acceptance of external conditions of life not within one's control, an attitude that relates to two distinctions describable in terms of the inner versus the outer: that between ethical qualities within oneself and external conditions of life, and that between accomplishments whose achievement is entirely up to oneself and accomplishments that lie beyond one's control.
The paper begins with an examination of the use of "ming " in early texts, such as the Tso Chuan and the Kuo Yü. It shows how the early use of the character carried both a normative and a descriptive dimension, making possible scholarly disagreement about the interpretation of the use of "ming" in the Analects and the Mencius . As against scholars (such as T'ang Chün-i) who emphasize the normative dimension, the paper argues that the descriptive dimension is more prominent in the Mencius, though the situation is less clear in the Analects. It discusses how the early Confucian attitude toward ming is primarily one of willing acceptance of external conditions of life not within one's control, and how this attitude relates to other ideas such as the early Confucian attitude toward anxiety and worries or the Mencian idea of the "unmoved mind." Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of how the attitude toward ming relates to the "inner-outer" distinction.
Populist Government of Familial Empathy in the Mencius
Chün-chieh Huang, National Taiwan University
Early Confucian political thought has often been characterized in terms of an "inner-outer" distinction-in terms of the idea of "inner sageliness and outer kingliness." In Mencius' thinking, the idea takes the form of advocating humaneness as the ideal basis for government. The paper examines the content and ramifications of this Mencian idea.
The paper discusses how, for Mencius, ideal government should be led by the leader who is truly human, by which Mencius meant "humane." And humaneness is none other than the "heartmind that cannot tolerate people's suffering" (pu jen jen chih hsin), which leads to the "government that finds people's suffering intolerable" (pu jen jen chih cheng). Such government operates through the governance of familial empathy and according to the working principle of populism (min pen ). The top priority of state business is not magisterial pleasures but popular welfare, and the empathic sovereign should serve the people by sharing magisterial pleasures with them as members of one happy family.
The paper goes on to contrast Mencius' political thought with other theories such as those of Hsün Tzu (governance by educative decorum and laws), Mo Tzu (governance by universalist utilitarianism), and the legalists (governance by totalitarian laws). It discusses how Mencius' political ideal was received in the political history of China and inspired rejections of dictatorial government, and then concludes with some reflections on the practicability of the ideal.
Duty and Consequence Orientations and the Internal-External Distinction
Cedric Pan, National University of Singapore
The distinction between inner (nei) and outer (wai) occurs in the early Confucian idea of inner sageliness (nei sheng) and outer kingliness (wai wang), and is sometimes used to describe the relation between jen and li. It comes up in Kao Tzu's debate with Mencius on human nature in Mencius 6A:4, with Kao Tzu arguing that benevolence is internal (jen nei) and rightness is external (yi wai ). Mencius disputed the distinction, but did not spell out what according to him belongs to the "external." The paper examines what constitutes the "external" for Mencius, especially in the context of his political philosophy.
In Mencius 1A:1, Mencius gave a wholesale dismissal of profiting the state. The clincher is: "All that matters is that there should be benevolence and rightness. What is the point of mentioning the word 'profit'?" Mencius takes as "internal" the cultivation of one's original goodness. But what of the "external"? For Mencius, what is right or benevolent to do is also what will bring about the greatest happiness to the greatest number, and so the "oughts" governing social relations can be consequence-based as well as duty-based. The paper argues that the "external" for Mencius is given by the consequence orientated "oughts" as distinct from the duty or benevolence orientated "oughts," and that this, in a way, justifies Kao Tzu's assertion.