Organizer and Chair: Clark W. Sorensen, University of Washington
Sunhyuk Kim, Stanford University
Using the case of South Korea, this paper examines the relationship between civil society and the state in democratic transition and consolidation. It begins with a synoptic overview of South Korean civil society today, where numerous groups and organizations with a variety of new goals are mushrooming. To understand and explain the present configuration of South Korean civil society, the paper selects and analyzes three crucial "cuts" in the historical evolution of South Korean civil society in terms of 1) the major actors in civil society; 2) the relations among civil society groups and civil society's interactions with political parties and the state; and 3) the nature and content of the issues raised by civil society groups. The first cut (1960-61) is characterized by: (1) rapid radicalization and the subsequent dichotomization of civil society between leftist and rightist forces; (2) a close alliance between radical students and reformist party politicians; and (3) idealistic discussions of national reunification. The crucial features of the second cut (1973-76) include: (1) a sharp dichotomy of civil society between such pro-democratic forces as students, labor unions, church groups, and opposition politicians on the one side and corporatist associations and politicians on the other side; (2) an underground alliance of pro-democratic forces that was too harshly repressed by the state to pose an effective challenge to authoritarianism; and (3) concentration on the theme of democratization and intentional avoidance of the reunification issue. The third cut (1985-87) is represented by: (1) an extremely critical role of the middle class; (2) close cooperation among civil society groups as well as between civil society and political parties, which finally led to a grand democratic alliance; (3) effective combination of the issues of democratization and reunification. Based upon such a historical analysis, the paper concludes that an identity crisis South Korean civil society is currently experiencing-a transition from the movement society to an interest-group society-is not at all something to worry about. Rather, it is argued that South Korean civil society is moving and should be moving from an amorphous assemblage of anti-government forces to a tightly-organized and well-defined interest group society.
Seungsook Moon, Harvard University
Rapid economic growth in East Asia has drawn much attention in the West. A growing body of literature on economic development in the region focuses on the roles of the state in initiating and directing economic growth. A major problem with this body of literature is that it treats the state as a gender-neutral institution. Yet, analyses of economic development policies illustrating marginalization of women or indifference toward them suggest that gender is constitutive of the working of the state.
This paper is intended to explore the gendered nature of the Korean state in its historically specific form during the past three decades of industrialization. A crucial feature of the Korean state during this period is that a core of the state is controlled by the military. Since the military is a male-dominated institution, the military control of the state is highly suggestive of the masculine nature of the Korean state. In order to elaborate this, I will introduce the idea of militarized masculinity marked by the following elements: 1) organized use of violence; 2) rational calculation and discipline, and; 3) distance from reproductive activities culturally defined as feminine.
The discussion of militarized masculinity of the Korean state allows one to understand why gender hierarchy characterized by masculine dominance in Korean society has persisted in the midst of rapid socio-economic changes accompanying industrialization.
Rica Melanie D. Ligeralde, Miami University, Ohio
Up until the declaration of martial law in 1972, the Philippines was known as the showcase of democracy in Asia. With the tumultuous regime of Corazon Aquino and the tense year under Fidel Ramos, it is worth exploring whether Western-style democracy is the best form of government for the Philippines. After all, the political problems the country faced prior to 1986 remain, and, in fact, seem to worsen as the days go by. Politicians engaged in acts of graft and corruption, elitism in electoral politics and endless debates in the legislature while the country suffers from power failures and water shortages seem to be inconsistent with the goals set forth during the 1986 revolution.
This paper argues that political culture as explained by the social anthropologist Mary Douglas and later developed by Aaron Wildavsky in his works on political phenomena, may provide a reasonable explanation to the problems faced by democracy in the Philippines. Their theory is based on sociocultural viability that explains how ways of life maintain and fail to maintain themselves. They go on to say that the viability of a way of life depends on a mutually supportive relationship between a specific cultural bias and a specific pattern of social relations. This is referred to as the compatability condition. Thus, social relations generate preferences and perceptions that sustain those relations.
Based on these assumptions, Douglas and Wildavsky argue that societies may be categorized according to five ways of life, namely, hierarchy, egalitarianism, fatalism, individualism and autonomy/hermit. This categorization is based on the grid group typology proposed by Douglas. She claims that there are two dimensions of social behavior: group and grid. Group refers to the extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units. The greater the incorporation, the more individual choice is subject to group determination. Grid denotes the degree to which an individual's life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions. The more binding and extensive the scope of the prescriptions, the less life is open to individual negotiation. Thus, a hierarchy is high group and high grid, fatalism is weak group strong grid, individualism is weak group and weak grid and egalitarianism is strong group and weak grid.
Considering these therefore, democracy will thrive in societies that are either individualistic or egalitarian, because it requires the participatory norms that come with the low-grid cultures. Individualistic political cultures inculcate the value of competition for its own sake. Thus, politicians who lose in elections leave voluntarily as opposed to declaring martial law or assuming emergency powers. Egalitarian political cultures on the other hand, keep a watchful eye on authority figures. People who have such a culture have no problem criticizing the establishment for its policies, underhanded tactics and attempts at political manipulation. This prevents the leaders from becoming too powerful or arrogant.
Conversely, a hierarchical political culture may prove lethal to the development and maintenance of democracy. Since the assumption is that the authority can be trusted to do the right thing at all times, it leaves people ill-equipped to check the abuse of that trust. In fact, a deferential attitude towards an authority figure and loyalty to one's family or peers are fertile ground for authoritarianism to arise. The same is true in a fatalistic political culture because of the combination of deferential and alienated orientations. According to Wildavsky (1990), fatalism generates and is generated by authoritarian political systems. When a majority of the people are withdrawn from the political system, it increases the possibility for the exercise of arbitrary governmental power, thus making the citizens even more withdrawn from politics. Furthermore, it makes democracy even more unlikely to survive.
Using this theoretical framework, this paper posits that the Philippines' hierarchical political culture poses a major obstacle to the maintenance of democracy. By looking into the various facets of Philippine culture, such as the deferential attitude towards authority, strength of kinship ties, patron-client relations, role of the church in political socialization, class division and continued elitism in society, we can understand the difficulties faced by democracy in the country.
Democracy as the Filipinos know it, has failed to provide the opportunities for growth and development, peace in the urban and rural areas and basic services which the people so desperately need. What has occurred since 1986 is not just the restoration of democracy, but the restoration of the status quo as it was just before martial law.
Despite recent changes in the structure of electoral financing, campaign strategies employed and the entry of new figures into the political scene, these are not sufficient to guarantee democracy's survival and the government's ability to provide the best way of life for the people. Belief in democracy is not a panacea to solve all societal ills, nor is it enough to overcome the country's hierarchical political culture. Concrete changes in the country's level of economic growth, massive improvements in the system of public education and the wherewithal to keep democracy as the basis of political development may ultimately provide stability in the country. Once the masses are given the opportunities to actually be part of the system in terms of jobs, education and a higher standard of living, perhaps democracy will survive. Then, the country may overcome the damaging aspects of their political culture and pursue the goal of development. The hierarchical political culture, although a legitimate problem, may be dealt with, and the time to do it is now.
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