Organizer: Linda Benson, Oakland University
Chair: A. Thomas Grunfeld, State University of New York
Discussants: Thomas Barfield, Boston University; Elliot Sperling, Indiana University
The need to tear down what Paul Cohen (JAS 1988) has called the "1949" barrier is the departure point for this panel on modern Inner Asian history. The focus here is narrowed to the pivotal period of 1945 to 1955, in order to examine the origins of CCP minority policy, before and after "liberation," and to explore the continuities that mark the transition from "Republican" to communist rule in China. In the process, new interpretations are offered of the origins of the CCP minority policy, as well as new explication of the varying approaches and policies used by the CCP in establishing its authority in Inner Asia.
In the first paper, Justin Rudelson begins the discussion by surveying some of the factors which determined CCP policy in the border regions, focusing on the CCP's need to take into account foreign policy considerations on one hand and specific, existing conditions in the border regions on the other. Further, his paper strongly suggests that Chinese views of race and ethnicity were of particular significance in determining the course of policy within minority regions after 1949, as seen in markedly different attitudes toward Tibetans, Mongols and Turkic peoples of the northwest.
In presenting his case study, Christopher Atwood explodes existing assumptions about CCP policy by focusing on the case of Inner Mongolia. He demonstrates how the party owed much more to the model provided by Japanese backed autonomous regimes in Manchuria than to policy formulation at Yan'an or to Mao Zedong thought. He illustrates clearly the myth of a "passive" minority population by showing how the local intelligentsia was the crucial element in local politics, both before and after 1949.
In her paper, Linda Benson turns to Chinese policies in Xinjiang. Here, rather than constituting a break from past Chinese policies in the region, the CCP in 1949 clearly shared the GMD view of what constituted problems in its northwestern-most frontier region. As a result, in some areas of policy CCP solutions did not differ significantly from those proposed earlier by the GMD.
Together, these papers strongly assert that the formulation of CCP policies in Inner Asia drew from a variety of sources; that as conditions in border regions prior to 1949 varied, the CCP adapted its policies accordingly; that this adaptation continued to mark CCP policy after 1949; and, finally, that despite the changes begun in 1949, a marked continuity can be traced in Chinese [e.g. GMD and CCP] approaches to minority issues, before and after 1949.
Justin Rudelson, Tulane University
When the Communist Chinese incorporated (colonized) Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet into China, different methods were employed, sometimes "peaceful" and sometimes extremely violent, to accomplish this goal. Differences in policies, the speed and manner in which they were carried out in these regions were the result of four primary factors: 1) Chinese foreign policy considerations, 2) Historical contact with China, 3) The types of government existing in the border regions, and 4) Chinese views of race and ethnicity.
China had to estimate the possibility that its actions might have a destabilizing effect on the border regions and that this could lead to foreign intervention. Of greatest concern was the Soviet Union; as a result, the CCP's operations in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang called for a cautious approach. On the other hand, they faced no threat of foreign intervention when they invaded Tibet.
The historical contact between China and these three borderlands affected the amount and timing of China's efforts to assert its authority. Both Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang had been controlled periodically by China, and elites of both regions had maintained relations of one sort or another with China, allowing for a different, more political approach. Tibet's isolation from China ultimately required a swift and forceful assertion of power.
The existing government in the border regions in 1949 had a strong influence on the smoothness of China's transition to power there. Because Tibet had a spiritual/political leader of high stature, it presented the greatest difficulty. China felt that in order to gain control of Tibet it had to destroy its religious/political institutions. In the other two regions, such drastic action was deemed not necessary or was attempted only gradually.
Finally, Chinese racial views affected the fierceness of its implementation of control policies. Chinese considered the Mongols, Xinjiang Turks, and Tibetans vastly different with respect to race and level of cultural development. While Chinese maintained somewhat positive views of Mongols and Turks, allowing for a slow policy of directed social change, their overtly racist views of Tibetans led to the PLA's brutal destruction of Tibetan cultural life.
Christopher Atwood, Indiana University
Previous accounts of the development of the PRC's minority policy emphasize the role of the Chinese Communist Party in developing its own Chinese adaptation of Marxist Leninist principles. General accounts implicitly claim that:
The Mongols of Inner Mongolia are particularly important as a test case of these views. Since the founding of the CPC, the Mongols were the only border nationality with significant participation in the party. Inner Mongolia was also crucial in the CPC's relations with the Soviet Union and a major battleground during the civil war. The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region is regularly touted as the first autonomous region founded by the CPC and the first victory of the party's minority policy. An examination of how the Chinese Communist Party secured control over Inner Mongolia during the civil war of 1945-1950, however, indicates that all four of the implicit assumptions noted above are in this case false. Instead we can say that:
Comparative data from other border regions of China suggests many obvious differences in the way that the CPC secured its eventual control in Korean, Hui, Kazak, Uygur, and the Tibetan communities. These differences cry out for comparative research and thorough reconsideration of the whole framework of Chinese minority studies.
Linda Benson, Oakland University
Official Chinese accounts of 1949 Xinjiang invariably describe a peaceful transfer of power, largely eased by the change in allegiance of top government and military officials in the region from the GMD to the CCP. Almost immediately, so the accounts go, the region began to experience fundamental change, the direct result of Xinjiang's liberation from past repressive rule and the peaceful inauguration of a new age.
The changeover in 1949 was, in fact, relatively peaceful, considering that it occurred in an era of bloody civil war. Two factors in particular contributed to this: first, the CCP took care to provide continuity in the form of highly visible, but powerless, local figureheads; second, they had the backing of thousands of co-opted GMD soldiers still in the region in 1949. While these were both important, such measures nonetheless did not forestall scattered armed resistance, as the continued "bandit suppression" campaigns of the 1950s attest.
If the CCP's arrival can be described as relatively peaceful, then how accurate is use of the term "liberation"? A comparison of GMD policy in the 1940s with CCP "revolutionary" policies of the 1950s suggests that in fact continuities were more striking than changes in terms of the problems identified and solutions proposed. The CCP's use of military campaigns, the plans to move large numbers of Han Chinese settlers to the region, the selection of local figureheads for the new government, and the monopoly of Han Chinese on the highest political and military posts were all aspects of Chinese policy familiar to the local population: all had been hallmarks of Chinese rule in the region ever since it was first made a Chinese province in 1884. Indeed, in the view of some of the native population, the only major change was that power had now shifted from one group of Han Chinese to another. Only this time the new leaders had the power to implement, rather than just talk about, their plans for Xinjiang's development.
Finally, comparison of the decades before and after 1949 also shows that under the GMD's nominal rule the local population had developed its own political movement, based on vaguely democratic principles and calls for self determination. The CCP's attempt to co opt this movement and its leaders after 1949 attests to its continuing power among some of Xinjiang's Muslims, who, some five decades later, provide their own sense of continuity to Xinjiang history by viewing government policy simply as "Chinese" policy, thereby acknowledging the similarities that have marked all Chinese led governments in Xinjiang.
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