Organizer: Quansheng Zhao, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Chair: Allen Whiting, University of Arizona
Discussants: Harry Harding, The Brookings Institution; Alastair I. Johnston, Harvard
University; Samuel Kim, Columbia University; Quansheng Zhao, The Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology
This AAS round table panel will examine the PRC's external behavior patterns, the international and domestic roots of these patterns, and their effect on Beijing's policy choices in the post-Cold War era. By connecting the roles played by changing priorities, policymaking structures and domestic considerations, and strategy and tactics, this panel emphasizes the link between different variables in the study of Chinese foreign policy. Such an approach provides a framework for analysis and should facilitate a better understanding of Chinese foreign policy, its principal characteristics, and its future directions as well as the policy making process itself.
This approach, at the same time, recognizes the importance of each individual element, as well as the linkages among them. It argues that both international and domestic conditions are crucial for the formation of Chinese foreign policy, and we need to apply the linkage approach to better understand these conditions. One of the major topics of the discussion is about Chinese foreign policy choices in the post-Cold War era. Although it is always dangerous to predict the character of a country's foreign policy and its choices, general trends in China's recent foreign policy are evident and seem likely to continue into the post Deng era.
Even though Deng's policy of "reform and openness" has not always progressed smoothly, the Beijing leadership seems confident that periods of slow economic growth and political instability, such as that following the 1989 Tiananmen incident, will only be temporary. China today is relatively stable politically and is prospering economically. According to the Asian Development Bank, China's economy grew 7 percent in 1991 and 12 percent in 1992, an "exceptional strength" in the recessive world economy. The confirmation of Deng's reform policy at the Communist Party's 14th national congress in October 1992 was a signal that Beijing will continue its reform and open-door policy in the post Deng era.
Given this apparent dedication to modernization, the only circumstance under which China might readopt a Maoist policy would be a drastic internal political shift toward radicalism akin to that of the Gang of Four. Such a shift would necessarily isolate China from the outside world and damage its modernization drive. However, a return to isolationism seems highly unlikely for a variety of reasons.
The Cultural Revolution produced a consensus among the Chinese people-never again! Radical revolutionary ideas no longer appeal to the majority of the people; instead, the drive toward a market economy now enjoys widespread support. In addition, the policy of reform and openness launched by Deng has gained a momentum of its own and has already transformed the Chinese policy making structure from vertical to horizontal authoritarianism. Those forces that inspired Deng's policy continue to grow stronger. Chief among them are the many supporters and beneficiaries of economic development and modernization efforts; the technocratic bureaucrats that are emerging among the elites; the passing away of the revolutionary generation; China's opening up to the outside world; and the enormous increase in the diversity and complexity of foreign policy decisions. Although the struggle to succeed Deng seems certain to be fierce (the removal of the brothers Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing from top military positions at the 14th party congress highlighted another round of the power struggle), the transformation process from vertical to horizontal authoritarianism will continue, ensuring that political inputs and interests are considered in the formation of Chinese foreign policy.
China's top foreign policy priority is likely to remain, as Robert Sutter has stated, "the pragmatic quest for a stable environment needed for effective modernization and development"; or, as Donald Zagoria has expressed the matter, China's foreign policy will "continue to be subordinated by its powerful desire to modernize the Chinese economy and the need to maintain a peaceful international environment." China's foreign policy will remain pragmatic, economically oriented, and cooperative yet independent.
However, even though the general direction of China's future development will be toward economic modernization and greater political participation, it will most likely follow a zigzag pattern such as China has experienced in the past. A pragmatic and economically oriented foreign policy does not guarantee that China will not use military force to solve external conflict. Regime survival has always been a top priority in the PRC's policy making calculations. Beijing, under a reform-minded leadership, did not hesitate to use military force to repress its own people in the Tiananmen incident; military options cannot be ruled out just because of the prevalence of reform.
At the domestic level, nationalism has been one of the driving forces behind China's modernization efforts. No Chinese leader, conservative or reformers alike, can afford to be cast as lishi zuiren, or the people condemned by history. Therefore, highly sensitive issues, such as the issue of Taiwan, the dispute over the South China Sea Islands with several Southeast Asian countries, and the dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, are potential areas for the PRC's use of military force.
Faced with the changing dynamics of the post-Cold War era, the PRC must address a number of issues concerning its present and future policies. Here, China's primary foreign policy goal is in line with its domestic priority-economic modernization. To promote economic development and to control problems (such as the confusion over currency exchange rate in 1994, and inflation caused by an overheated economy in the early 1990s) arisen in the economic reform has become a central task for all PRC leaders, old and new alike, and will continue to be a basis for foreign policy decisions.
To combat the uncertainty in its post Tiananmen relations with the United States, the sole superpower in today's world, Beijing has developed a three layered strategy to prepare for any undesirable future developments. China will continue to develop cooperative relations with Japan and the Western European countries. China will further expand its influence in East Asian regional affairs by cultivating relations with Japan, the newly independent economies (South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), and the ASEAN states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). And, China will set up an informal Asian socialist alliance consisting of China, North Korea, and Vietnam to resist Western pressure for political and economic liberalization.
As the PRC's international status is gradually restored and strengthened in the wake of Tiananmen, Beijing's leadership will become more confident in world affairs, enabling China to exhibit a more positive behavior. If the Chinese regime perceives itself as less threatened by foreign powers, particularly the United States, Russia, and Japan, it will become more cooperative in international affairs, and will behave more like an insider and a partner than an outsider or challenger. But if the world seems more threatening, considerations of national security and the issue of regime survival will take top priority in Chinese foreign policy, which may push Beijing to extreme directions.
China will remain a regional power with global aspirations. Regionally it will concentrate its external activities in the Asian Pacific area. In global matters, China will go along with the mainstream of world opinion while seeking to advance its own independent policy. Given the rapid decline of Soviet power, the collapse of Communism, and the advent of a more cooperative relationship between Moscow and Washington, the extent to which China can pursue an independent course is questionable. The concept of an independent foreign policy is perhaps more useful for China with regard to the North South divide; China would like to play a leading role in the Third World and will act more independently in its relationships with industrialized countries on behalf of Third World countries. As the only Third World member of the UN Security Council, China may follow the policies of the major powers on some occasions, but is more likely to act as a protector of Third World interests.
China is more than likely to enlarge the degree and range of its participation in international activities. Its pursuit of economic modernization and regional stability will incline China toward greater cooperation on security matters and increasing economic and cultural exchanges. The decline of Communism will also enable Chinese foreign policy to become more flexible in many areas. China has already established formal diplomatic relations with South Korea and Israel. One may expect that its relations with South Africa will develop further now that Beijing is less constrained ideologically. At the same time, nationalism will continue to influence Chinese foreign policy, and the protection of China's national integrity and national interests may make territory related issues a factor in foreign policy disputes. The issue of Taiwan will continue to pose the potential for international conflict, especially if the increasing demand for independence by Taiwan receives any support from Western powers. Other territorial disputes, such as that with Japan over Diaoyu Island and those with Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines over the South China Sea islands may also become sources of international conflict.
Finally, Chinese foreign policy behavior in general will be discussed. It is believed that its behavior patterns may continue to be a mixture of flexibility and rigidity, the balance varying according to the changing dynamics of domestic politics, the Beijing leadership's perception of the outside world, and the international environment.
With the participation of several leading scholars in the field, such as Allen Whiting, Harry Harding, and Samuel Kim, this panel will be useful to clarify uncertain issues in Chinese foreign policy and promote research and scholarship in China studies one step ahead.
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